Abstract
Introduction
Portable Communication Systems (PCSs) [4] do not require any physical circuits between subscriber and service provided. PCSs technology allows users to carry portable communication devices that are low power, low cost, and small in size with mobile networking capabilities. Radio waves being transmitted in space make it easy for anyone to eavesdrop on the contents of communication, so there are more security and privacy threats than with wire line communication system. A secure communication system should possess four major features: secrecy, authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation [5] .
With the advancement of mobile technology, wireless networks have become widely available and interconnected. For allowing people to get connected seamlessly using their mobile devices without being limited by the geographical coverage of their own home networks, roaming services have been deployed, for example, GMS [6] [7] [8] [9] , 3GPP [10] , and WLANs. A typical roaming scenario involves three parties: a roaming Mobile Station (MS), a Visited Location Register (VLR) and a Home Location Register (HLR). MS, who is a subscriber of HLR, is now in a network administered by VLR. There is a direct link between MS and VLR and another between VLR and HLR. But there is no link between MS and HLR. To prevent fraudulent use of services, user authentication is a mandatory requirement. The conventional way to perform user authentication is to let VLR contact HLR who acts as a guarantor for vouching that MS is a legitimate subscriber of it.
Public key cryptosystems have been used for mobile authentication in wireless networks [1] , [13] , [14] , [15] . He et al. [15] used blind signature to design a privacy protection scheme for mobile stations; the scheme also provides MS authentication and access authorization. Lee and Yeh [1] proposed a trust delegation based scheme, where an MS, that is registered to a home location register (HLR) or home network, proves its registration to a VLR (or serving network).
In this paper, we propose a new RDSA protocol against the False Home Location Register Attack in 3GPP. The proposed authentication protocol is based on Public Key Signcryption [11] [12] technique to solve the problem of FHLR attack on Tian F. Lee protocol. Security analysis, storage capacity, computational cost and communicational overhead have been discussed for the proposed protocol.
The reminder of this paper is recognized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work on the concept of delegation authentication protocols on 3GPP wireless communication systems. Section 3 reviews the concept of the enhanced authentication protocol of Tian-Fu Lee [12] . Section 4 describes the FHLR attack on the Tian-Fu Lee protocol. Section 5 presents our enhancement protocol. Section 6 proposes the security analysis. Finally Section 7 is the conclusion.
Related Works
Wireless communication systems [4] [16] provide mobile users with global roaming service. To support greater properties, numerous authentication approaches employ the public-key system to develop their protocols. For instance, long et al. [17] in 2004 presented a localized authentication protocol for inter-network roaming across wireless LANs. Lee et al. [18] in 2005 proposed a private authentication protocol to prevent the home location register (HLR) from eavesdropping on communication between the roaming station (MS) and the visited location register (VLR). However, due to hardware limitations, MS cannot support heavy encryption and decryption, and therefore wastes a lot of time in exponential computations.
In 2005, Lee and Yeh [1] presented the concept of delegation in wireless communication systems and proposed delegation based authentication protocol to solve the problem of data security, user privacy, computational loads and communicational efficiency in the system. Their protocol also adopted the public key cryptosystem to achieve the security requirements. To increase the communicational efficiency, and save authentication processes such that VLR does not need to contact HLR frequently, and a rapidly re-authenticate MS. Therefore, Lee protocol not only has a lower computational load for MS, but also provides greater security.
Although the protocol of Lee and Yeh exhibit non-repudiation in on line authentication process, it still has a weakness in off line authentication process. This weakness is that any legal VLR can forge authentication messages without the help of the mobile user. However, these forged messages are verified, and the mobile user cannot repudiate that he is the producer of these message. The malicious VLR can trick the HLR by these forged messages. That is, the protocol of Lee and Yeh does not have the property of non-repudiation in the off line authentication processes. Without the non repudiation property, a protocol may inspire a mobile user to deny that he has used services and refuse to pay, or inspire a services provider to overcharge a mobile user for services that he did not request [2] .
In 2009, Tian F. Lee et al., enhanced Lee and Yeh protocol to solve the off line nonrepudiation problem by using the backward hash chain to ensure that the authentication messages in off line process cannot be forged. Although the protocol of Tian et al. solve the off line non-repudiation problem in Lee and Yeh protocol, it still has a weakness against False Home Location Register (FHLR) attack. In [3] , FHLR attack on Lee and Yeh [1] protocol has been introduced. We adapt the FHLR attack given in [3] to attack Tian F. Lee et al protocol [2] which is an enhancement Lee and Yeh protocol.
Review of Tian F. Lee et al protocol
This section briefly reviews the enhanced delegation based authentication protocol of Tian F. Lee et al. [2] for PCSs, some notation should be explained here: 
and stores them in its database, where
On line authentication:
Step 1:
Step 2:
n (a number less than q) and sends
Step 3: Step 4:
, if the verifications are not achieved, the request is rejected; otherwise, VLR sends
to HLR.
Step 5:
and obtains K of each MS . If he successfully searches the corresponding σ in its database according to K , then he computes ) (
n is a random number selected by HLR, and sends
Step 6: 4. FHLR attack on Tian F. Lee et al protocol
In Fig. 1 an attacker can first divert the VLR to an HLR under control of the adversary, and we denote this impersonated HLR by FHLR with identification F ID . The attacker modifies
After the diversion, the attacker, that acts as a VLR, then obtains a session key ( ) [ ]
After the attacker receives } { 5 \ L (from HLR), which is defined as in (3), where 3 n is a random number selected by HLR, the attacker successfully obtains the session key 1 [ ]
Now that VLR and MS follow the protocol and proceed to the remaining steps of the on-line and off-line authentication of Tian-Fu Lee. Figure 2 shows the messages used in this attack. This attack occurs because there is no security protection on H ID when it is sent through communication channels to VLR, so in equation (5) ID by using a signcryption algorithm to ensure the data security, user privacy, computational load and communicational efficiency. 
Proposed RDSA Protocol
This section presents a new RDSA protocol that solves the problem of FHLR based on TianFu Lee and signcryption algorithm and then analysis its security and performance. In our protocol we employ a signcryption algorithm [12] to provide an efficient mobile authentication scheme and to solve the problem of FHLR which described in the previous section. Figure 3 illustrate our protocol which works as follow.
Setup
The setup phase is similar to that of the authentication protocol of Tian-Fu Lee [2] . 
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Off-line authentication
The Off-line authentication phase is similar to that of the authentication protocol of Tian-Fu Lee. The proposed Robust Delegation-Based Authentication protocol is shown in figure (3) .
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Security Analysis
The analysis of our protocol is similar to those of the protocol of Tian-Fu Lee et al, in offline authentication processes, and therefore is not presented herein.
User Identity Privacy
In our protocol MS has one private/public key pair ) , ( K σ . The real identity of MS is not transmitted over the entire network for authentication purposes. Because we use pseudonym K generated by HLR in the registration phase to represent the identity of MS in the network, no one except HLR can obtain any information about the identity on MS. Also for the private/public number pair ) , ( Therefore our protocol guarantees that MS generates the authentication message in online authentication processes.
MS

Mutual Authentication
In the online authentication process, VLR authenticates MS by verifying the signcrypted text ) , , , 
Computational Cost and Communicational Overhead
In this section we calculate the communicational cost and communicational overhead in each step of our scheme (in online authentication process) as seen in table I. Here we assume that n=5, so HASH=1, ENC=1 160*2+32*2= 48 bytes EXP = modulo exponentiation, HASH = one-way or keyed hash, DIV = modulo division, MUL = modulo multiplication, ADD = modulo addition, ENC = encryption using private key, DEC = decryption using private key.
Storage Capacity
Storage capacity should be taken into account when designing security protocols for mobile network environments since the mobile equipment has limited storage capacity. Considering the example we take in figure 2, [1] . In summary, the capacity of EEPROM is large enough to accommodate the above parameters of our scheme.
Conclusions
This investigation addresses the weakness of the enhanced delegation-based authentication protocol raised by Tian-Fu Lee, which cannot solve the problem of FHLR in online authentication process. Therefore, a new Robust Delegation Signcrypted Authentication Protocol (RD-SAP) against the False Home Location Register Attack in 3GPP is presented. The proposed authentication protocol is based on Public Key Signcryption technique and which provides the user identity privacy, mutual authentication, nonrepudiation. This study also presents an enhanced protocol, which is not only has the same security properties as the original protocol, but also avoids the weakness in the original protocol. Therefore this scheme enjoys both computational and communicational efficiency.
